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The title for this essay comes from 
the fact that contrary to the general 
Western perception, Pakistan does 
actually work as a country, not as 
well as many, but better than some; 
and that it is in no immediate dan-
ger of collapse, except as a result of 
misguided and reckless US policies. 
Pakistan is in many ways surprisingly 
tough as a state and political society. 
The loss of Bangladesh in 1971 does 
not set a precedent for present-day 
Pakistan. The Pakistan of 1947-71, 
two regions with very different 
histories and cultures, separated by 
a thousand miles and a hostile India, 
could not possibly have lasted – no 
state so constructed could have lasted 
long. The provinces of West Pakistan 
however form much more of a unity.
The strength of Pakistan as a state 
has, paradoxically, been demon-
strated by the course of its troubles 
over the past year. These have seen 
the administration of President Per-
vez Musharraf effectively crippled 
amidst widespread public protests, 
and elections leading to the victory 
of the main opposition parties. All 
this has taken place amidst escalat-
ing violence by Islamist extremists 
including the assassination of opposi-
tion leader Benazir Bhutto, attacks 
on senior generals and state offi cials, 
and insurgencies in some of the 
Pashtun areas of the country. The 
United States has launched several 
missile attacks into Pakistani territory 
along the border with Afghanistan in 
an effort to kill leaders of the Taleban 
and Al Qaeda who are sheltering 
there while orchestrating attacks on 
US and allied forces in Afghanistan.
All of this suggests an apocalyp-
tic scenario, which is indeed how 
it has been portrayed in much of 
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the Western media, with scenarios 
being advanced of Islamist revolu-
tion and Pakistan’s nuclear weapons 
falling into the hands of terrorists. 
In fact none of this was on the cards. 
Islamist violence is of course deeply 
worrying, but the Islamist parties 
suffered a crushing defeat in the 
elections. Their public support is not 
remotely sufficient for them to take 
over the country, and Pakistan is 
therefore far indeed from the condi-
tion of Algeria in the early 1990s, 
let alone Iran in the late 1970s. 
Aside from the Islamist problem, 
developments in Pakistan were not 
nearly as violent or disturbed as both 
the media coverage and the excitable 
commentaries of Pakistani journal-
ists and intellectuals would have led 
one to believe. Even Benazir Bhutto’s 
murder did not, as might have been 
feared, lead to a repeat of the mass 
killings between her Sindhi co-ethnics 
and the Mohajirs of Karachi which 
occurred in the late 1980s and early 
1990s. In general, the political process 
was peaceful not just by the stand-
ards of past political transitions in 
Pakistan, but those of South Asia as a 
whole. The reasons for this have to do 
with profound elements of stability in 
Pakistani political society – elements 
of which the other face, unfortunately, 
is political, social and economic stag-
nation. So while Pakistan in the short 
to medium term is more stable than 
it appears (barring an attack from the 
United States) the country’s long-term 
future may be dark indeed. I shall 
return to this theme later in this essay.
The likely course of political devel-
opments over the next year or so 
illustrates both the surface instability 
and the deeper stability of the Paki-
stani system. Musharraf’s own stay in 
office now looks numbered in months 
at most. It is almost impossible to see 
how he can co-exist with a govern-
ment all of whose elements have 
vowed publicly to bring him down. 
The first act of the new Prime Minister, 
Yusuf Raza Gillani, has been to rein-
state the Supreme Court judges sacked 
by Musharraf. There can be little doubt 
that these will use their renewed 
powers to undermine the President’s 
authority and perhaps impeach him.
But how Musharraf goes is more 
important than whether he goes – 
because how he goes will say a great 
deal about the underlying nature 
of Pakistan’s political system, and 
indeed about the fact that his depar-
ture will not be nearly as important as 
it will doubtless be presented to be in 
the Pakistani and Western media. Bar-
ring his assassination – which cannot 
be ruled out, given the hatred of him 
on the part of the Islamist radicals – I 
am pretty sure that in the end, it will 
be the Army high command itself 
that will politely but firmly ask him 
to resign for the good of the Army 
and the country, just as they did 
with a previous military ruler, Gen-
eral Ayub Khan, in 1968. And there 
can be little doubt that faced with 
this request from his own generals, 
Musharraf will indeed step down.
The Army will do this, however, 
not just to end Pakistan’s growing 
political impasse, but also to secure its 
own institutional interests; and key to 
those interests is the ability to go on 
playing a critical, and intermittently 
dominant role in Pakistani politics. 
Talk of ‘returning the Army to bar-
racks’, and turning Pakistan into a 
purely civilian political order is just 
that – talk. The Army has played a 
central role in politics since the early 
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1950s, and is not about to give up that 
role just because a particular military 
ruler steps down – any more than 
the generals gave it up when Ayub 
Khan and Yahya Khan stepped down, 
or Zia-ul-Haq was assassinated. 
The most important reason for the 
army’s domination of the Pakistani 
state is simply that it is the most 
effective institution that Pakistan 
possesses (which is admittedly not 
saying a great deal). The army has 
certainly used military government to 
transfer enormous properties into its 
own hands. However, these properties 
are run on the whole for the benefit 
of the armed forces as a whole, and 
are not simply a kleptocracy of gener-
als – unlike in Nigeria, for example. 
The chief reason for the role of 
the Pakistani army in the Pakistani 
state is that – unfortunately – it is 
Pakistan’s only effective modern 
institution. Its cohesion and effective-
ness can be traced to the successful 
melding of British military structures, 
the fighting traditions of the Punjabis 
and Pashtuns, and the particular 
respect of the Muslims of the Subcon-
tinent for warriors. The Army is also 
the biggest middle-class employer 
in Pakistan, and this contributes to 
the soldiers’ contempt for what they 
see as corrupt and tyrannical ‘feudal’ 
landowners and urban bosses. The 
army’s internal culture, and great 
(though now endangered) internal 
cohesion is demonstrated amongst 
other things by the wildly different 
social origins and personal culture 
of Pakistan’s different military rul-
ers and chiefs of staff. Within an 
educated Pakistani context, it would 
be hard to find four men more dif-
ferent than Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, 
Zia ul Haq and Pervez Musharraf; 
yet all were profoundly shaped by 
the army, and utterly loyal to it.
The military, however, also owes 
its political role in large part to the 
civilian politicians themselves – not 
only because of their corruption, 
incompetence, and inability to 
develop modern political parties, but 
also because whenever in opposi-
tion, most appeal to the Army to 
overthrow the civilian government 
so that they can return to power.
Removing Musharraf will allow 
the Army to take a step back from 
direct involvement in government, 
while continuing to manipulate the 
politicians, and manage much of the 
state, from behind the scenes. Step-
ping back in this way will allow the 
generals to avoid the intense unpopu-
larity that Musharraf has attracted 
as a result of his perceived role as 
‘Busharraf’, the obedient executor 
of America’s orders in the ‘War on 
Terror’ (even as the US media has 
damned him for disloyalty and irre-
sponsibility in that same struggle).
Above all, persuading Musharraf 
to step down will greatly increase the 
Army’s freedom of manoeuvre when 
it comes to playing the politicians off 
against each other and choosing who is 
to lead the government. The Army has 
always had great power in this regard 
because, due to the fragmented nature 
of Pakistani political society, no-one 
party can ever hope to gain an abso-
lute majority of votes or seats. Even 
the wave of public sympathy for the 
Pakistan People’s party after Benazir 
Bhutto’s assassination only produced 
a popular vote for the PPP of 30.6 per 
cent. All civilian governments there-
fore are coalitions, a fact which allows 
the generals to play the different coali-
tion members off against each other.
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At present, the military is gravely 
hampered in this regard by the hos-
tility of all the parties to Musharraf. 
The Islamists of course blame him for 
doing the United States’s bidding; and 
much of the PPP is hostile to the mili-
tary in principle. This is not, however, 
true of the second most important 
figure in the new coalition govern-
ment, Nawaz Sharif, whose fraction of 
the Muslim League won 19 per cent of 
the vote. Sharif was himself originally 
a creation of Zia ul Haq’s military 
regime, and his hostility is not to the 
military as such, but to Musharraf 
personally, the man who overthrew 
Sharif’s government in a coup in 1999. 
With Musharraf removed from 
the scene, it will be far easier for the 
military to play Sharif off against 
the PPP, and if they see it as in their 
or Pakistan’s interests, to help bring 
down the coalition government, 
reconcile Sharif with Musharraf’s 
former supporters from Sharif’s 
party, manage new elections in such 
a way as to favour this new bloc, and 
put together a new civilian coalition 
government led by Sharif – all with 
the appearance of ‘democracy’. 
Sadly, it seems likely that before 
a year has passed, the new coalition 
government will probably have given 
every opportunity for the military to 
take such a step with the approval of 
much of the Pakistani public. That is, 
unless it is unlike every other civil-
ian government that has ever ruled 
Pakistan – and why should it be? 
The basic problem for Pakistani 
governments, both civilian and 
military, is that the entire political 
system runs on patronage – and in 
a very poor country, there is just not 
enough patronage to go around. Every 
party, and every individual politician, 
therefore comes to power having 
promised jobs and favours to their 
supporters – many of which he or she 
cannot then fulfill. After a while, the 
disappointed supporters inevitably 
drift off to join the opposition or to 
lead a revolt within the ruling coali-
tion; and when enough of them have 
drifted, the government falls. Much 
of Pakistan’s corruption can be traced 
to this endless striving after jobs and 
money. The need to create coalitions 
increases the tendency to corruption 
still further. This is why when prime 
minister Yusuf Raza Gillani was 
Speaker of parliament in the 1990s he 
was credibly accused of having placed 
no fewer than 500 of his relatives and 
constituents on the paid parliamen-
tary staff – though it must be said that 
this was regarded as going a bit far 
even by Pakistani political standards.
 In his new job, Gillani has already 
complained that he is having to create 
numerous new ministries and jobs 
in order to put the coalition together; 
and it is not just a matter of those 
jobs. Each of the beneficiaries in turn 
will create new jobs, and hand out 
contracts and favours to his or her 
supporters. So bureaucracy, corrup-
tion and incompetence will all rise, 
destroying the image of the govern-
ment in the eyes of the population; 
and yet still there will not be remotely 
enough jobs or favours to satisfy all the 
members of the coalition. Add to this 
the fact that Nawaz Sharif and the PPP 
have always been rivals in the past, 
and pressure from the United States on 
Pakistan to take actions that would be 
bitterly unpopular with much of the 
population, and for which the politi-
cians will blame each other, and even 
a year in office may be too optimistic 
a scenario for this new government.
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All this may seem a depressing 
picture, and in many ways it is; but a 
depressing picture is still a lot bet-
ter than the catastrophic scenarios 
so often painted for Pakistan. And 
to be both fair and realistic about 
Pakistan, one needs to understand 
that country in the context not of 
the modern developed world, but 
of the Indian Subcontinent where 
it is actually situated. When com-
pared to Britain or France, Pakistan 
inevitably fails. When compared 
to India, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, 
Nepal and Sri Lanka, things do not 
look so terrible. If Pakistan were 
an Indian state, then in terms of 
development and order it would 
find itself somewhere in the middle, 
considerably below Karnataka but 
considerably above Bihar. In fact, a 
good many key features of Pakistan 
are common to the Subcontinent 
as a whole, from dynastic politics 
through the savagery of the police 
and the corruption of officialdom 
to the everyday violence and latent 
anarchy of parts of the countryside. 
 It is however extremely important 
for us to understand how Pakistan 
works, in order to develop poli-
cies that may do something to help 
develop that country, and to avoid 
ones which risk catastrophically 
destabilising it. The West – and 
China, Russia and India too – needs 
to develop an approach to Paki-
stan which recognises the supreme 
importance of this country but is 
based on a real understanding of 
it, and not on fantasy, whether of 
the paranoid or optimistic variety.
 To do this, we need to transcend 
the clichés about that country which 
dominate the Western media – 
‘dictatorship’ versus ‘democracy’, 
‘fundamentalism’ versus ‘mod-
eration’, ‘free and fair elections’, 
‘corruption’ and so on. All too often, 
such words in a Pakistani context 
have quite different real meanings 
from those attached to them by 
Western writers and their reader-
ships. Robert Conquest’s remark 
about a young British Communist 
killed fighting in Spain applies also 
to many present Western commen-
tators on Pakistan: ‘Not even high 
intelligence and a sensitive spirit 
are of any help once the facts of a 
situation are deduced from a politi-
cal theory, rather than vice versa.’
 One has to grasp how a genuine, 
even passionate belief in law and 
democracy in Pakistan co-exists 
with a belief that these institutions 
are like the ropes around a boxing 
ring. They may help to limit the 
area of conflict, but they do not in 
themselves govern what goes on 
inside the ring. Or in the words 
of one member of a great local 
landowning and political family:
This is a difficult country. If 
neighboring landowners see that 
you are weakening, there are always 
a lot of people to take your place, 
and they will hit your interests in 
various ways, like bringing lawsuits 
to seize your land or your water. 
If you can’t protect yourself, your 
followers and tenants will ask how 
you can protect them. A semblance 
of strength must be maintained, or 
you’re finished. The trick is to show 
your armed strength without getting 
involved in endless blood-feuds... 
Such rivalries between families and 
clans are also conducted in the law 
courts, but the ultimate decision 
always lies with physical force.
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A few hundred miles to the north, 
a Punjabi landowner and member of 
parliament, matter-of factly described 
to me how he had ordered his men 
to ambush and kill the son of a 
neighbouring landlord and politi-
cal rival, after his own nephew had 
been killed in an election dispute: 
‘I am not a violent man by nature; 
but in this country, you have to be 
prepared to fight back if attacked. 
If you lose respect, you are noth-
ing.’ These are descriptions straight 
out of the 15th-century English 
Paston letters, and the world of late 
medieval ‘bastard feudalism’. 
As in that world, and as stated 
above, what dominates Pakistani 
politics and government above all 
is the intersection of lineage and 
patronage: not just jobs and contracts, 
but legal, administrative and when 
necessary physical protection from 
enemies and rivals – and perhaps 
most of all, from the predatory police. 
As a police chief in the interior of 
Sind told me candidly: ‘I try to stop 
my boys raping women and torturing 
people to death. Beyond that, you 
have to be realistic. Anyway, we need 
to raise more money from the people 
just to do our job half-way properly.’
How much of politics works was 
splendidly evoked by a young man 
in a modern Karachi office when I 
asked him how he was going to vote:
I voted PPP in the last elections 
because it was the will of my uncle, 
the head of our family, though 
actually I think the Muslim League 
has done a better job in government. 
In previous elections, sometimes he 
said to vote PPP, sometimes Muslim 
League, depending on what they 
promise him, whether they have 
fulfilled promises in the past, and 
which of his friends or relatives is 
now important in that party. He owns 
a flour mill. He helps us find jobs, 
gives us the transport to take us to 
the polling booths, so it is natural 
that we give him our vote in return. 
He is respected because of his wealth 
and because his mother and aunt are 
the two eldest ladies in our family. 
Everyone listens to them on family 
matters. They arrange marriages 
and settle quarrels. They are very 
much respected so uncle is too. But 
he decides in political matters. The 
women can’t do that because they 
don’t go out of the house. They can’t 
even remember which candidate is 
which. If you ask them the next day 
they have forgotten which is which. 
That is why we have symbols for 
parties. They can’t read or write, 
so we tell them about politics. 
But I must obey my mother in all 
personal things. If she had said I 
can’t take up this job, then I can’t.
It is patronage more than any-
thing else which determines the 
political actions and allegiances 
of most local actors, especially in 
the countryside, and which holds 
together (and sometimes splits apart) 
the varied clans that are the build-
ing blocs of Pakistani politics. Even 
the repeated revolts in Baluchistan 
can be described chiefly in terms of 
tribal struggles for a greater share of 
Baluchistan’s resources and central 
government patronage, rather than 
as modern nationalist movements.
By contrast, mass parties in the 
Western sense play only a very 
limited role, and one that may be 
reduced still further by the death 
of Benazir Bhutto and the pos-
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sible consequent weakening of 
her dynastic party, the Pakistan 
People’s Party (PPP). One reason 
why Pakistani parties have not 
developed into modern mass par-
ties, but remain dependent on local 
bosses, their clients and gunmen, is 
that the parties cannot afford to pay 
party workers between elections.
The life of the foundation blocks 
of Pakistani politics, the petty nobil-
ity in the countryside and the local 
bosses in the towns, is defined by 
their daily juggling of patronage 
to actual and possible clients, their 
continual petitioning of officials for 
favours and protection. These power-
ful, intertwined classes give Pakistan 
an underlying stability which belies 
the surface volatility and violence 
of its politics – but also help to 
frustrate reform and progress.
Elements of democracy do exist 
in Pakistan, but in the modern 
Western media and academia the 
word has become loaded with so 
many abstract and general positive 
connotations and associations that 
it has become difficult to disentan-
gle what it may actually involve 
in a particular place. Western 
domination of international politi-
cal discourse in turn means that 
local people themselves may have 
the greatest difficulty in describing 
their own system. In Pakistan and 
many other countries this creates 
a copulation of illusions, whereby 
the West projects its ideological 
assumptions onto Pakistan, and 
Pakistani intellectuals and journal-
ists reflect them back to the West.
The Islamist political groups 
are trying to replace the clan and 
patronage politics of the ‘feudal’ 
landowners and urban bosses with 
their own version of modern mass 
politics, but so far with only limited 
success. One key reason for their 
failure to date is the archaic nature of 
much of Pakistani society; for – quite 
contrary to most Western percep-
tions – Islamist mobilisation thrives 
not on backwardness, but on partially 
achieved modernity. Thus most Paki-
stani Muslims reject Islamist appeals 
not because they are ‘moderates’, 
in the largely meaningless Western 
phrase, but because they are tradi-
tionalists, attached to local cults and 
practices which the Islamists wish 
to abolish; and in the countryside, 
under the sway of landowning fami-
lies which hardly favour land reform 
in the name of Islamic revolution. 
Rather than a struggle between 
Islam and modernity, or between 
extremism and moderation, as usu-
ally described in the West, what 
we are seeing is the challenging 
of local traditions by two forms of 
modernity: the secular, Western-
influenced modernity practiced 
by the wealthy classes of the main 
cities, and projected through parts 
of the mass media; and the reform-
ist, modernizing religious ideology 
being preached by the Islamists. 
‘It is patronage more than 
anything else which determines 
political actions and allegiances’
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The Islamists are themselves 
divided into numerous different 
groups, only some of which support 
terrorism, and many of which are 
mutually antagonistic. In 2007, the 
alliance of Islamist parties (MMA), 
which had scored a striking success 
in the elections of 2002, collapsed. 
Its biggest component, the Jamaat 
Islami, left the alliance and boycotted 
the February 2008 elections, and the 
alliance itself suffered a crushing 
defeat even in the Pashtun regions 
of the North West Frontier Province 
(NWFP), northern Baluchistan and 
the Federally-Administered Tribal 
Areas (FATA) which are its heartland.
Opposition to Islamist radicalism 
within Pakistan does not, however, 
by any means necessarily indicate 
opposition to the Taleban’s struggle 
against the United States and NATO 
within Afghanistan – a struggle that 
draws much of its strength from 
the Pashtuns of Pakistan. A central 
question – perhaps indeed the central 
question for Afghanistan and the 
West’s effort there is whether the 
Pastuns of Pakistan can be led into 
supporting a much tougher attack 
on Taleban support in their own 
regions. The Afghan war and the 
rise of Islamist extremism in Paki-
stan are thus two sides of the same 
issue, linked by the Pashtun ethnicity 
which is divided between these two 
countries by the Durand Line, a fron-
tier that the Afghan state and most 
Pashtuns have never recognised. 
Like other peoples tradition-
ally divided along tribal lines – the 
Somalis and Chechens spring to 
mind – the Pashtuns have com-
bined an extremely strong sense 
of ethno-religious identity with 
a very poor capacity for modern 
mass nationalist organisation and 
state-building. Repeatedly since 
the mid-19th Century, Pashtun 
unrest has taken the form of jihads 
against infidel rulers or their local 
clients, in the name of Islam and 
usually led by religious figures. 
So while the Taleban contains new 
elements, their struggle is also part 
of a long and powerful tradition. We 
should remember the British experi-
ence in this regard. Waziristan, where 
the British fought a bitter campaign 
against a tribal jihad in the 1930s, is 
today the heartland of Taleban sup-
port and Islamist extremism among 
the Pashtuns, and has been the 
object of several Pakistani military 
campaigns and US missile strikes. It 
is not encouraging in this context to 
remember that despite the deploy-
ment of tens of thousands of troops 
over several years, the British never 
did catch the leader of the jihad, the 
Fakir of Ipi, who died in his bed, in 
his home village, twenty years later. 
Most importantly and dangerously 
for Pakistan, Pashtuns, while only 
some 12 per cent of Pakistan’s popu-
lation, are thought to make up more 
than 20 per cent of the Army. Despite 
the Army’s discipline and cohesion, 
there have already been several 
incidents of small Pashtun-majority 
units refusing to fight against fel-
low Pashtuns in the tribal areas, 
and even surrendering en masse. 
This brings me to what I see as the 
only plausible short-to-medium term 
scenario for Pakistan’s disintegration 
as a state: namely, an American attack 
on Pakistan’s tribal areas intended to 
destroy Taleban forces there, and to 
capture or kill Osama bin Laden and 
other Al Qaeda leaders. Not a contin-
uation of the missile attacks that have 
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already taken place, and which can 
be attributed, however implausibly, 
to the Pakistan military, nor limited 
cross-border raids, but a major, open 
and sustained ground offensive. 
There can be little doubt that – as 
I was warned by Pakistani friends 
close to the military – a US occupa-
tion of the tribal areas would provoke 
widespread mutinies in the Pakistani 
army, with not just individuals but 
whole units going to fight against 
US forces. At that point, the possibil-
ity of the disintegration of the army, 
and with it the state, would come a 
giant leap closer. This would lead to 
chaos and civil war, with different 
ethnic groups fighting for supremacy. 
In the Pashtun areas, Islamist revo-
lution might well be the result.
Such a development would mark 
a severe defeat for the West, and 
a great victory for Al Qaeda and 
its allies. For Britain, it would be a 
particular danger, given its Pakistani-
origin Muslim population, parts of 
which are already radicalised. It is 
therefore in Britain’s vital interests to 
do everything possible to prevent a 
future US administration from tak-
ing such a step, however badly the 
war in Afghanistan may be going. 
Afghanistan is a secondary issue for 
the West, and for the ‘war on terror-
ism’ in general. Pakistan is a primary 
interest. Even if the West has to quit 
Afghanistan, the resulting civil war 
there can be contained. That could 
not be remotely true of Pakistan, 
with its huge population (six times 
that of Afghanistan or Iraq), large 
armed forces, nuclear weapons, and 
extensive diaspora in the West. 
Such a US attack on Pakistan is not 
on the cards at present, and indeed 
probably will never occur, since US 
military analysts are well aware of 
the disastrous consequences, and 
since as long as the United States is 
pinned down in Iraq, it will in any 
case not have the troops for any such 
operation. Unfortunately however, it 
also cannot be permanently excluded 
as a threat. Indeed, if, God forbid, 
Al Qaeda were to carry out another 
large-scale and successful terrorist 
attack on the US homeland, a US 
intervention in Pakistan against 
Al Qaeda would become a virtual 
certainty. What is less clear is how 
the US will react to a deteriorating 
future situation in Afghanistan, if 
NATO allies begin to quit, the Hamid 
Karzai administration crumbles, 
and the US public loses patience. 
A great deal will depend of course 
on what Pakistan has itself done 
in the meantime to crack down on 
Taleban support, and to pursue the 
leadership of Al Qaeda. The US has 
been urging an alliance between the 
Pakistani military and the Pakistan 
People’s Party with just that goal 
in mind, and on the surface there 
seems every basis for it. After all, 
not just Benazir Bhutto and other 
politicians but a senior officer, Lt 
General Mushtaq Baig, have been 
killed by Islamist terrorists in recent 
months, and more than 1,000 Paki-
stani soldiers and policemen have 
already been killed fighting Islamist 
insurgencies. If this cannot bring the 
politicians and the Army together 
in a genuine community of inter-
est, it is difficult to see what can.
I hope very much that this will in 
fact be the case. However, such a genu-
ine alliance, and a resulting strong 
offensive against Islamist militants in 
the tribal areas, certainly cannot be 
taken for granted. As already indi-
10	 Policy	Report
cated, even with Musharraf gone the 
intense distrust between the PPP and 
the Army will go on being fuelled by 
the military’s political manoeuvring 
and also most probably by intense bat-
tles over patronage, as the PPP tries to 
claw back some of the jobs and proper-
ties that the military arrogated to itself 
under Musharraf’s administration, in 
order to reward their own supporters.
Equally important is the underly-
ing ambiguity in the basic attitudes of 
the Pakistani population, as reflected 
in numerous opinion polls. On the 
one hand, most strongly oppose 
Islamist militant violence within 
Pakistan. On the other, an equally 
overwhelming majority oppose the 
United States’s ‘war on terrorism’ 
and Pakistan acting as the United 
States’s tool in that war. As a PPP 
activist told me last summer in 
Peshawar: ‘One reason we need a 
legitimate, democratically-elected 
government in Pakistan is so that we 
can tell the Americans to go to hell.’
This creates a strong temptation 
for any Pakistani government to 
do precisely what the US and the 
Afghan governments fear: to make 
a deal with the Islamist militants 
in the Pashtun areas whereby they 
will promise to stop attacks within 
Pakistan, in return for being given 
a free hand to continue crossing 
into Afghanistan. Of course, this 
deal would not be advertised as 
such by the Pakistani government 
or military. But Nawaz Sharif has 
already proposed reviving Mushar-
raf’s earlier strategy of trying to 
co-opt and reconcile the Pakistani 
Taleban supporters rather than 
attacking them, and it is not difficult 
to see how some such deal could 
form a covert part of such a plan.
With US and British soldiers 
fighting and dying in Afghanistan, 
the suspicion of such a deal would 
cause outrage in both Washington 
and London. However, before allow-
ing such outrage to translate into 
much heavier pressure on Pakistan 
– let alone military action in Paki-
stan – we need to keep a number of 
things firmly in mind. The first, as 
already stated, is that Pakistan, not 
Afghanistan, is the truly vital coun-
try in this region when it comes to 
the ‘war on terrorism’. The second 
is that having made a shambles of 
Afghanistan and Iraq, we cannot 
even dream of running Pakistan. 
Only Pakistanis can govern Paki-
stan – and that means that we will 
have to work with whatever govern-
ment Pakistan throws up, however 
uncomfortable for us this may be.
The last thing that we need to 
recognise is the most difficult of all. It 
is that Western powers are sojourners 
in the Muslim world. The peoples 
and states of the region have to live 
there permanently. Some of them, like 
Iran, have been around in one form 
or another for thousands of years. 
Even Pakistan existed, and influ-
enced Afghanistan, for half a century 
before 9/11; and unless we ourselves 
bring about Pakistan’s destruction, 
it will go on influencing Afghani-
stan long after we have packed up 
and gone home. Americans, who 
despite their recent setbacks are still 
a relatively young and optimistic 
empire, have immense difficulty 
in understanding this. The British 
should not. After all, they packed up 
and left this region in the past, and it 
managed to survive without them. 
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